The concept of code has a long and varied history across the sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. In the interdisciplinary field of biosemi otics it has been foundational through the idea of code duality (Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991); yet it has not been free from controversy and questions of defini tion (see, for example, Barbieri 2010). One reason why code has been so central to modern semiotics is not simply a matter of the linguistic heritage of semiology and the work of Jakobson who straddled both semiology and semiotics. Rather, it has been the programmatic reconceptualization of code that is woven through the work of modern semiotics' founder, the father of both biosemiotics and zoo semiotics, Thomas A. Sebeok. A biologist manqué, a communication theorist in fluenced by cybernetics, and a semiotician deriving from the "major tradition" of Peirce, arguably Sebeok's most systematic considerations of code were offered in his essays on zoosemiotics, largely from his 1963 coining of the term onwards. The present article principally revisits the 1972 collection of Sebeok's zoosemiotic es says and suggests that his particular observations in respect of analogue and digital codes and their relation to evolution in the world of animals harbors an opportunity to rethink and potentially resolve, through an ethological lens, cur rent controversies regarding the status of code.
Introduction
Most accounts of code are not selfreflexive. They seldom define code, nor do they give a sense of its history. In textbooks on mathematics, computing, informa tion theory, and cryptography, the discussion of codes begins with entropy and algorithms, the status of codes and their ontology (see, for example, Welsh 1988; McEliece 2002) . Some mathematics textbooks allocate time to defining the con cept of code; hence, Biggs (2008: v) states that coding is "replacing symbolic in formation, such as a sequence of bits or a message written in a natural language, by another message using (possibly) different symbols. There are three main reasons for doing this: Economy (data compression), Reliability (correction of errors), and Security (cryptography) ."
Yet this seems a rarity. In my own subject area -communications, media, cultural studies -the notion of "codes" and "coding" is omnipresent where any consideration of the semiotics of communications is on the agenda (partly as a result of the subject's celebration and serial anthologization of one seminal Eco influenced essay -Hall 1973; see Cobley 2013) . In largescale attempts to define the subject area (e.g., Donsbach 2008) , that omnipresence also becomes nebu lous, disparate (see Craig 2008 ) and difficult to reduce to the kinds of laws char acteristic of mathematics. Even in "classic" semiotics, the selfreflexiveness is absent: Eco (1976) launches straight into postShannon communication theory, deeming the selfreflexive questioning of code unnecessary because it entails just four different phenomena: a) a set of signals ruled by internal combinatory laws, b) a set of states of an entity that are taken into account as a set of notions about the state of that entity, c) a set of behavioral responses on the part of the destina tion, d) a rule coupling some items from a) with some from b) or some from c) (Eco 1976: 36-37) . The latter formulation, arguably and not unproblematically, has been most prevalent in semiotics although not always observed: code as a system of rules that links signs to meanings (e.g., Krampen 2010) .
It is understandable that this formulation is so prevalent. The notion of code really only developed, especially in cryptographic terms, in the nineteenth cen tury. As dictionaries of etymology will reveal, code has fraternity with the Latin codex, a book of laws; it is also related to codicil -an amendment to a document or a kind of overwriting of parts of a document. Subsequently, code was coopted for what Singh (1999) , in his popular science book, calls "The mechanization of secrecy" -sending encrypted messages. The code as a law, then, is imbricated with the sender and receiver's knowledge of the rules for decoding and the poten tial interceptor's lack of knowledge of those rules. Clearly, then, in this formu lation, one can conceive of coding as having existed well before the nineteenth century -in early writing systems or even nonwriting systems for accounting, such as the quipu of the Incas developed nearly 5,000 years ago (Ascher and Ascher 1997 ). Yet, like semiotics, which has a history predating its emergence as a disciplinary field in the last hundred years, the common use of the word "code" is recent, arising thousands of years into the process of routine coding by humans.
This point bears mentioning despite the fact that the purpose of this article is not to carry out the much needed tracking of the genealogy of code and coding. Instead, the focus here is on three simple points: that the term code has one prev alent meaning and some more general ones -as Hoffmeyer (2008: 83) notes, "the term has quite different connotations in different disciplines (e.g., jurisprudence, genetics, computing)"; that the prevalent one is taken for granted in a way which is responsible for other slippages of the term; and that the pivotal moment in the fate of the conception of code arrived with Sebeok's development of zoosemiotics from 1963.
Taking contemporary semiotics as a source, it is clear that there are some leading definitions of code. In his final book, Sebeok (2001a) repeatedly made reference to the five major codes: the immune code, the genetic code, the meta bolic code, the neural code and, of course, the verbal code. Hoffmeyer (2008: 84-85) refers to code in general as the "customary use of distinct entities or ac tions for communicative ends" giving examples of a dresscode, a behavioral code, etc. He adds that semiotics sees code in the frame of contextfree rules for encoding, transmission and decoding as posited centrally to Information Theory and in a looser version of code as a vehicle for creation of meaningful activity, a semiotic resource that enables the creation and expression of certain types of meaning but not others. Barbieri (2003 Barbieri ( , 2010 , another biosemiotician who has a broad take on the issue, sees semiosis in the genetic code, at the very origin of life, with contextfree codes only being superseded by interpretation three bil lion years later. Semiosis and interpretation, he adds, "are distinct processes" (Barbieri 2009: 239) . In semiotics, it is clear, then, that much endeavor still needs to be carried out in order to work through the notion of code inherited from infor mation theory and cryptography. Indeed, the information theoretic notion of code has even provided a strong debating point in biosemiotics despite the co gency of one the latter's inaugural texts on code duality (Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991) . However, this article argues that Sebeok's use of the term "code" evolved in a recognizable way during his first zoosemiotic period represented by the 1972 collection of Sebeok's essays, Perspectives in Zoosemiotics, as opposed to the second zoosemiotic period. 1 What exemplifies the two zoosemiotic periods in Sebeok's writing is the place of code -dissipating in the second period but, as will be seen in the focus here on the first period, in thrall not to information 1 Maran (2010: 318) identifies the first zoosemiotic period as [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] , although this could be put back to 1960 when Sebeok delivered his first zoosemiotic paper at Burg Wartenstein; the second zoosemiotic period of Sebeok, following a sixyear hiatus in which he published no origi nal article in zoosemiotics, is identified by Maran as 1975 onwards, to the collection entitled Essays in Zoosemiotic (1990) ; strictly, Sebeok's second period of zoosemiotics encompasses the 1980 New York Academy of Science colloquium on "Clever Hans," the subsequent writings on the Clever Hans phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s, and the essay on signifying behavior in the domestic cat, published in 1994 but eventually included in Sebeok (2001a) . theory , in fact, but to an informationallyinflected linguistics (and, even so, al ready beginning the process of dissipation).
Sebeok's use of "code"
The essays in Perspectives in Zoosemiotics are, to invert a cliché, an unmixed bunch. As Sebeok admits in the Foreword (Sebeok 1972: 4) , some themes are re peated and some issues are restated for the different purposes to which the essays were originally geared. Nevertheless, it does seem that there was devel opment of the notion of code in relation to animal communication as Sebeok con tinued to write throughout the 1960s. By reading closely and reproducing a num ber of quotes, it is hoped that that development is made manifest. The initial formulations on code offered by "Animal communication" (published 1965) are fairly straightforward: "A code is that set of transformation rules whereby mes sages are converted from one representation to another, a message being a string generated by an application of a set of such rules, or an ordered selection from an agreed, that is, conventional, set of signs" (Sebeok 1972: 75) .
The traditional association of "code" and "rule" is invoked, as is "transfor mation" -possibly, but not definitively, a nod to Chomskyan generative grammar and its influence during the period. In an earlier paper, published in 1962 but dating back to 1960, Sebeok states that "By coding is meant an operation, gov erned by strict and logical rules, aimed at gaining increased efficiency by having elementary signals organized into patterns of alternative actions; by code is meant everything that the source and the receiver know a priori about the mes sage" (Sebeok 1972: 9) .
"Rules" are evident here again, but Sebeok also has an explicit communica tion/information theory frame in the reference to "source" and "receiver." This is not just a matter of context -Jakobson, one of Sebeok's key teachers (see Cobley et al. 2011 ), had formulated "context" in his celebrated communication model of 1960 as a matter of the "referent," but he formulated "code" as "common to the addresser and addressee" (Jakobson 1960: 353) . Echoing the latter, the key phrase in the quote from Sebeok is "a priori" -existent and not depending on the situa tion. Thus, in the first part of "Semiotics and ethology," which appeared in German, Czech and Polish in 1966, Sebeok states that "The source and the desti nation are therefore said to fully, or at least partially, share . . . a code, which may be defined as that set of transformation rules whereby messages can be converted from one representation to another" (Sebeok 1972: 123) .
This, then, is the general orientation of Sebeok's description of code in his early writings in zoosemiotics.
If the delineation of code as an a priori rule is scrutinized further, it is clear that Sebeok's "code" has specific sources. In his 1960 paper, Sebeok says of the hu man, "However, as to the code, his freedom is restricted: his selection must be made out of 'prefabricated units,' among sets of simultaneous binary distinctions . . . elements in an algorithm (or decision procedure) concatenated into sequen tial patterns" (Sebeok 1972: 17) . One telling phrase in this quote is repeated in his "Animal communication" essay of 1965:
The communicating organism's selection of a message out of its speciesconsistent codeas well as the receiving organism's apprehension of it -proceeds either in accordance with a genetic program dictating an almost wholly prefabricated set of responses or with refer ence to each animal's unique memory store which then determines the way in which the genetic program is read out. (Sebeok 1972: 72) The same phrase recurs a year later in the "Semiotics and ethology" paper:
In each species, the source of a message must share with its destination a code, the critical element of their communicative commerce constituting a particularized version of the uni versal "needtoknow." Every emitting organism's selection of a message out of its species consistent code, as well as the receiving organism's apprehension of it, proceed either in accordance with a "closed" prefabricated set of responses, or with reference to the animal's unique memory store which then directs the way in which the genetically precoded portion of the total behavior is acted out. (Sebeok 1972: 129) The key term in these quotes, to complement "a priori" here, is "prefabricated," as in the famous postWorld War II housing, made in standardized form before construction and habitation. Code, as such, precedes communication.
The three sources for Sebeok's assertions about code are, in light of his cen tral role in propelling international study of communication in the 1950s, predict able. They are (first order) cybernetics, communication theory and biology. A typical indicator of the influence of cybernetics can be seen in his 1964 "Discus sion of communication processes" where he states that "the coding of informa tion in cybernetic control processes and the consequences that are imposed by this categorization where living animals function as input/output linking devices in a biological version of the traditional informationtheory circuit with a trans coder added" (Sebeok 1972: 84) . This is clear cut. Slightly less clear cut, but typi cal of communication (and information) theory of the period if one is sufficiently acquainted with it, is the statement from the same 1964 source on the ultimate units of language, the atomic particles, if you will, of linguistic structure, orga nized in accordance with a binary code of utmost efficiency, so that whatever phase of the speech event is approached, the elicitation of its correlates must yield a distinct, unambigu ous, "yes" or "no" response. (Sebeok 1972: 86) Also unsurprising for those with a basic knowledge of Sebeok's career and intel lectual trajectory is the inflection towards biology in his statements on code. Yet, in the "Foreword" to Perspectives in Zoosemiotics it is significant that he states that "I became a professional linguist and, alas forever, a geneticist manqué" (Sebeok 1972: 2) . It is well known that Sebeok repeatedly defined himself as "a biologist manqué" (e.g., Sebeok 1991: 9; Sebeok 2011: 457) , so defining himself as a geneticist manqué in this one place is significant. Perhaps it suggests that the theme of coding that is so evident in this collection of essays is, ultimately, allied with the putative invariability of genetics. In the 1968 essay on "Goals and limita tions of the study of animal communication," Sebeok writes that "it is amply clear even now that the genetic code must be regarded as the most fundamental of all semiotic networks and therefore as the prototype for all other signaling sys tems used by animals including man" (Sebeok 1972: 117) .
Yet, in spite of the prominence of cybernetics, communication theory, and biol ogy in the discussion of code that runs through these early zoosemiotics essays, there is also a further, overarching factor. That factor is linguistics, in particular Jakobsonian linguistics. Perspectives on Zoosemiotics is dedicated to the geneti cist who taught Sebeok at Chicago, Joseph J. Schwab; but the figure who haunts its earlier pages is Roman Jakobson. In the 1964 "Discussion of communication processes," Sebeok gives an account of some of the key features constituting the human animal, concluding with the set of tools with which humans are endowed, identified by linguistics as "universal building blocks of language: these are called 'distinctive features'" (Sebeok 1972: 86) . In fact, his account of distinctive features is clearly inflected by communication/information theory. Thus, the quote on this topic given earlier can be reproduced here in expanded form; following his comment on distinctive features as the ultimate units of language, the atomic particles of linguistic structure, Sebeok states: "What is basic and general in the structure of the expression in this form of human communi cation is, first, the minimal system of oppositions grounded on maximal dis tinctions; and, secondly, the rank order according to which this elementary phonological component per vades the more complicated syntactic and other constructions" (Sebeok 1972: 86) .
Sebeok, at this stage in his career, clearly considered distinctive features the "most concretely and substantively realized" (Sebeok 1972: 86) part of general linguistic theory, although he notes that the "phylogeny of distinctive features . . . has clearly not yet progressed beyond mere speculation" (Sebeok 1972: 88) . To be clear, distinctive features are not the rules or code per se, but they are synony mous with the code to the extent that they constitute it. An analogous example might be football, where each individual kick or header or rebounding of the ball off the body is distinct but constitutes the code or rule by which handling the ball is outlawed. Jakobson had seen that the opposition of phonemes identified by Saussure (but, as Jakobson points out, introduced by the Polish linguist, Baudouin de Courtenay in 1870) was not a pure opposition. The opposition was susceptible of overlaps and was not sufficiently detailed to pronounce phonemes the basic, determinate units of language. Thus, in the 1940s and 1950s, Jakobson (Fant et al. 1952; Jakobson 1976 ) developed the theory of distinctive features in order to address the code underlying messages -that is, sounds more basic even than the phoneme; sounds that could not be reduced beyond their binary status.
Sebeok, communication and the "language myth"
In positing the fundamental constituents of the code underlying messages, Sebeok and Jakobson were effectively participating in the millennia old practice of what Harris (1978) calls "the language myth." In an impressive body of work, Harris's outlining of the key problem embodied in the language myth is purposely simple. It is that (in three words) "languages presuppose communication" (Harris 1978: 19 ); yet, in the face of this, the Western tradition of language study (as well as philosophy and then other areas of investigation, perfusing, ultimately, the laity and leading to a fullblown academic establishment called "linguistics") has been intent on taking verbal communication apart, breaking it up into bits to attempt to determine what language is. This "segregational view" "insists that "the language" (the words, sentences, etc.) is one thing and what people do with it (or with them) another" (Harris 1996: 14) . 2 In the process of propounding a 2 Even while discussing the concept of "code" in Sebeok's zoosemiotics, it is necessary to con sider Sebeok's later, semiotic, development of the concept of language as modelling. Harris' criticism of the segregationist view of the separation of "the language" from communication, as well as his own argument that "languages presuppose communication," appears to be incom patible with Sebeok's later insistence, especially from the early 1980s onwards, that "language" has nothing to do with "communication" (see Cobley 2004 ). Yet, it must be remembered that Sebeok's figuring of "language" as modelling is concerned neither with "the language" or "lan guages" pursued by Harris, but with the "mute verbal modelling device lodged in [the human] brain" (Sebeok 1988: 75) , a device that was exapted for communication purposes among Homo sapiens by way of the encoding of models into articulate, linear speech. By comparison with Sebeok's formulations, most other approaches to language are concerned with little more than "chatter." segregational view of language, successive "administrators" of the Western tradi tion have taken as read that there are languages and parts of languages while, at best, only according secondary value to the fact that communication is a crucible of creativity in a swirling environment of changing contexts. Along with the larger myth, Harris identifies a number of submyths: the efficacy of dividing up speech to reach the "essence of language"; sentences and propositions (especially in phi losophy of language); language as facilitating telementation (especially espoused by Saussure); and the submyth that concerns the present article, the fixed code fallacy.
Jakobson veered towards a fixed code model of language chiefly through his rejection of Saussure's principle of linearity. Harris (2003: 96) points out that Jakobson chose an introductory passage on syntagms from Saussure's Cours and made the mistake of assuming that Saussure's principle of the impossibility of pronouncing two linguistic elements at once meant that two elements could not be voiced at once. The linearity principle seemed orientated towards context in that one element had to be processed in relation to another element; Jakobson's rejection of the principle led to his promoting distinctive features, sound distinc tions at a level lower than the phoneme, which, as argued above, constitute a foundational, binary code. Jakobson's predilection for a theory of fixed codes in language was possibly a result of his interest in information theory in the 1950s, but it was also a logical product of "segregational" linguistics. 3 "Integrational" perspectives propounded by Harris (see, for example, Harris 1998) and focused on communication not language, insist that communication is cotemporal and wholly contextdependent. This means that the moment of communication is the crucial matter and that that which is a priori in communication is limited and by no means consists of cardinal rules. Another way of stating the "integrationist" view is to say that it proceeds from the idea that the message is not ineluctably dependent on the code. (Indeed, for all his work on distinctive features, there is evidence to suggest that Jakobson's reading of Saussure did not necessarily amount to a generativist account of code and message -see Jakobson 1990c Jakobson [originally 1942 ). While segregationists have dissected messages to discover a determinate form or a code in language, integrationists are more comfortable with indeterminacy of form in communication (see Harris 2006: 39-42 ).
3 It is well known that Jakobson was very taken with the writings of Peirce from the 1950s on wards. Yet this does not guarantee a departure from code in favor of "interpretation." Peirce instituted his own version of code through the type/token distinction, as Harris (1996: 10-12) recognizes. Jakobson focuses on this distinction, especially in the essays, "Some questions of meaning" (1990a) and "Quest for the essence of language" (1990b).
It is as well for zoosemiotics that the study of communication (as opposed to the study of language) has not been as slavish towards dividing messages and discovering codes. A central plank of animal communication studies for at least fifty years has been the insight that, when communicating, animals simply do not trade in the individual signs that might be demonstrated to be generated by a code. Rather, they send and receive "whole" messages. A specific cry, for exam ple, might indicate a warning which could, conceivably, be translated into the human equivalent of "Danger -stay away!." Typically, twentiethcentury linguis tics would be inclined to break up the human message, separate the noun, the verb or verbphrase and the preposition in order to analyze the composition of the message. Indeed, linguistics might even separate the individual distinctive signs in the message, showing how they interact, how they are distinguished from each other and how, when combined, they have a semantic purchase. Break ing down an animal's cry in this way is simply untenable -it does not possess identifiable syntactic components in the same way. One of the first ethologists to ruminate at length about this, Peter Marler (1961: 312) , quoted by Sebeok in Perspectives in Zoosemiotics, wrote that "in animal communication systems sev eral items of information seem to be conveyed by one discrete, indivisible signal. We do not normally find the different items of information represented by differ ent elements as is commonly the case in human language, where the component elements can be rearranged to create new 'messages.'" Since Marler wrote, this has become the accepted view in animal communi cation studies and has been borne out by much empirical research, such as that of Cheney and Seyfarth (1990; Seyfarth and Cheney 1993) into referentiality and specificity in vervet monkeys.
Certainly, Sebeok's later, "fully semiotic" phase after the founding of the IASS in 1969 witnessed a different view on codes and coding from the contextfree one. Looking back in 2001, he takes a jaundiced view of Birdwhistell's kinesics because the latter had "had minted this term by analogy with linguistics for the study of body motion from the point of view of how this may function as a com municative code" (Sebeok 2001a: xiii) . In his later writings Sebeok referred to a proliferation of "cultural" and "natural" codes, from those in specific film genres to those in the social world of cats. He also treated the term "code" as a synonym for "interpretant" (see, for example, Sebeok 2001a: 80 and 191 n. 13 ). Yet, even as the insights developed in zoosemiotics acted to question the theory of fixed codes in animal communication (including human communication), it is possible to see a change already during Sebeok's first zoosemiotic phase. In "Zoosemiotic struc tures and social organization" (1970), Sebeok described different kinds of cod ing, (not unproblematically) considering Mozart's Don Giovanni to consist of a primary code -"natural language"; a secondary code -libretto; a tertiary code -score; and then the performance (Sebeok 1972: 164) . 4 Sebeok's "fully semiotic" phase and the dissipation of his conception of codes as fixed is perhaps indicated in his late comment on "Jakobson's impact on my linguistics studies having been pivotal -I should add at once that it was far less so on my gradual evolution as a semiotician" (Sebeok 2011: 459) .
The lessons of zoosemiotics
Nevertheless, while the advent of zoosemiotics cannot be taken just as the cue for dismantling the notion of fixed codes -a dismantling that has thoroughly pene trated linguistics in the last forty years but which was led by semiotics in general -it seems to be that in Sebeok's work and, by association, the institutional devel opment of semiotics, zoosemiotics did have farreaching consequences in respect of code. These are already prefigured in the "first zoosemiotic phase" and can be whittled down to three related points that bear on semiotic research and theory: in 1968, Sebeok observed proscriptively that "descriptions of other sign systems tend to imitate (slavishly and erroneously) linguistics" (Sebeok 1972: 112) ; he noted that the "need for different kinds of theory at different levels of "coding" appears to be a pressing task" (Sebeok 1972: 112) ; and, in 1972, he posed a key question for current investigation, "what is a sign, how does the environment and its turbulences impinge upon it, how did it come about?" (Sebeok 1972: 4) . How ever, also in 1968, Sebeok remained convinced of the relation, as yet to be delin eated, of the genetic and the verbal codes: "the development of a normal neo nate's faculty of language, which presumably includes a set of the universal primes of the verbal code, is wholly determined by the genetic code, but in such a way that this identical genetic blueprint can then find a variety of expressions in phenogeny through space and time" (Sebeok 1972: 109) .
In his research into the further reaches of the verbal code, the immune code, the metabolic code and the neural code, the importance of the genetic code's rela tion of determination was never absent.
The future of the theory of code in general is difficult to forecast: the institu tionalization of academic research, teaching and publishing has entailed that some disciplines and fields can flourish even when their key concepts have been demonstrated to be defunct. The short history of the concept of code has largely been associated with information theory and pursued vigorously by mathematics in particular. This accounts for its origins as a concept in the nineteenth century. Yet it should not be forgotten that "code" has had an illustrious career in linguis tics during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Arguably, linguistics, along with cryptography, was best placed to translate and prosecute the more demotic conceptions of code to be found in the popular imagination; conversely, semiotics, as a result of its fashionable period from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, is probably responsible for the apotheosis of the demotic version of code as it has been promulgated in the twentyfirst century by the popular novelist Dan Brown (whose fearlessness and erudition is so great that he never writes the word "semiotics" -see Cobley 2007) . The development of code in the work of Sebeok, and especially through zoosemiotics, has a slightly less vexed history, culminat ing in a pluralistic conception of codes coupled with an as yet unspecified deter mining role of the genetic master code. The development of zoosemiotics, it has been argued here, was instrumental in the dismantling of the concept of fixed codes in culture, even while semiotics was thought by some (cf. Eco 1976) to be a code theory (and later denigrated for that even as it made such a theory redun dant). Furthermore, the relation between zoosemiotics and biosemiotics has even been misconstrued on this basis. A decade ago, Sebeok noted Peter Cariani, among others, has suggested that "biosemiotics has evolved from the study of animal communication to more general considerations of biological codes" . . . This, how ever, simplifies, even skews, the far more labyrinthine sequence of events culminating in biosemiotics to which zoosemiotics is but one contributing factor . . . This notwithstanding, zoosemiotics is doubtless "a particularly rich branch of biosemiotics because animals are in some sense semiosic mediators between creation and decay. On a macroscopic scale, they can be viewed as transforming agents fixed midway between the "composer" plants, organ isms that set interpretants in motion, and "decomposer" fungi, which break them down," viz., between phytosemiosic and mycosemiosic operations . . . Too, in their role as gobe tweens, animals process signs through media embracing the entire sensory spectrum, each -in conformity with Jakob's [von Uexküll] teachings -according to, but only commensurate with, its specific array of sense organs. (Sebeok 2001a: 42) .
The idea of a fixed code in linguistics, as Harris revealed so energetically, never really held up. Nor can it really be considered credible in its rigid sense in the world of culture suffused by verbality. Zoosemiotics, as a fifty year old disciplin ary field has, like semiotics in general, a future which will be untrammeled by the information theoretic concept of code. It is the task of biosemiotics, not as an intellectual evolution of zoosemiotics but as a nonautonomous distinct theoreti cal paradigm, to establish what the relations are, on the one hand, between the genetic code in its degree of adherence to contextfree coding and, on the other hand, cultural codes constantly embroiled in context.
